Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

Steven D. Crowther v. Murlan D. Carter : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James L. Shumate; Attorney for Respondent.
G. Michael Westfall; Gallian & Westfall; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Crowther v. Carter, No. 870524 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/723

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

tsnicr

JTAH
)OCUMENT
(FU
>0

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

*1°„ CT -* <27QSZH-c*
STEVEN D. CROWTHER, Trustee
for COMPUTER SERVICE OF
SOUTHERN UTAH PENSION TRUST,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 870524-CA
Classification Priority 14b

vs.
MURLAN D. CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from a Judgment of the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert
F. Owens, District Judge by Appointment, presiding, ordering the
dissolution of a partnership and allowing a redemption right for
the General Partner.

G. MICHAEL WESTFALL
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Gallian & Westfall
Dixie State Bank Building
One South Main Street
P.O. Box 3 67
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 628-1682
JAMES L. SHUMATE
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
110 North Main, Suite H
Cedar City, Utah
(801) 586-3772

84720

if p f * *
*

ft f jpjPf

DEC141987

r..

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STEVEN D. CROWTHER, Trustee
for COMPUTER SERVICE OF
SOUTHERN UTAH PENSION TRUST,
Case No. 870524-CA
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Classification Priority 14b

MURLAN D. CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from a Judgment of the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert
F. Owens, District Judge by Appointment, presiding, ordering the
dissolution of a partnership and allowing a redemption right for
the General Partner.

G. MICHAEL WESTFALL
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Gallian & Westfall
Dixie State Bank Building
One South Main Street
P.O. Box 367
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 628-1682
JAMES L. SHUMATE
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
110 North Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(801) 586-3772

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

11:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I.
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT IS NOT
AMBIGUOUS IN MAKING THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN INITIAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
AND ADDITIONAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO
BE MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

6

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
REFUSING TO PERMIT OPINION EVIDENCE
FROM A CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT.
THERE WAS NO FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THE
RECEIPT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE FROM THE
PROFFERED WITNESS

10

POINT III
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WILLFULLY BREACHED
THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING TO THAT EFFECT IS WELL
FOUNDED WITHIN THE RECORD

12

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE
PARTNERSHIP SHOULD BE DISSOLVED WAS FOUNDED
NOT ONLY UPON THE ACQUISITION OF MORE THAN
100 PERCENT OF THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS BY
THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, BUT WAS ALSO
FOUNDED UPON THE BREACH OF THE PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

12

POINT V.
THERE WAS ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD
FOR A DETERMINATION THAT THE INTEREST
- i -

RATE ON THE REACQUISITION COST SHOULD BE
1.5 PERCENT OVER STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN
UTAH'S PRIME LENDING RATE

14

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE ENFORCED, AND
THIS COURT SHOULD NOW ENFORCE, THE TERMS
OF THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED NOTE IN
ORDER TO ELIMINATE ALL ACCOUNTING AND
"WIND UP" PROBLEMS IN THIS CASE

15

POINT VII.
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR THE
REASON THAT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS
FAILED TO FILE A SUPERSEDEAS BOND

16

CONCLUSION

16

- ii -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Edwards v. Didericksen,
597 P-2d 1328 (Utah, 1979)

•

11

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Section 48-2-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as <
amended

2,

Section 48-2-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended .

3,

Rule 8, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals

16

•#•
- i
n -

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN D. CROWTHER, Trustee
for COMPUTER SERVICE OF
SOUTHERN UTAH PENSION TRUST,

]
]
]

Plaintiff-Respondent, ;
i

Case No. 870524-CA

vs.
MURLAN D. CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant, ]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this matter is
by virtue of the "pour-over" authority of the Supreme Court of
Utah and that Court's order in its case number 870350.

This is

an appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Court of Iron
County which dissolved a limited partnership and established
certain redemption rights in behalf of the general partner.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court err when it determined that the

Limited Partnership Agreement between the parties was unambiguous
as that Agreement defined

"initial" and
1

"additional" capital

contributions to be made by the limited partner?
2.
proferred

Did the trial court err
testimony

of

the

in refusing

to admit the

Defendant-Appellant's

"expert"

accountant relating to the Defendant-Appellant's interpretation
of the limited partnership agreement?
3.

Did the trial court err when it found that the Appellant

had willfully breached the Limited Partnership Agreement?
4.

Did the trial court err when it granted the Plaintiff-

Appellant's request to order the dissolution of the partnership.
5.

Did the trial court err in setting the interest

rate on the reacquisition cost at 1.5 percent over the State Bank
of Southern Utah prime lending rate?
6.
Deed

Did the trial court err in setting aside the Trust

and Note executed by the Defendant and construing the

dispute solely within the framework of the Partnership Agreement?
7.

Should this appeal be dismissed for failure to file

a Supersedeas Bond?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

48-2-10,

U.C.A.,

1953, AS

AMENDED.

RIGHTS

OF

A

LIMITED PARTNER(1)

A limited partner shall have the same rights as a

general partner to:
(a)

Have the partnership

books

kept

at the

principal place of business of the partnership, and at all times
2

to inspect and copy any of them;
(b)

Have on demand true and full information of

all things affecting the partnership, and a formal account of
partnership

affairs whenever circumstances

render

it just

and

reasonable; and,
(c)

Have dissolution and winding up by decree of

court.
(2)

A limited partner shall have the right to receive

a share of the profits or other compensation by way of income,
and to the return of his contribution as provided

in sections

48-2-15 and 48-2-16.
48-2-13.

U.C.A.,

1953, AS AMENDED,

LOANS AND OTHER

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED PARTNER.
(1)

A limited partner also may

lend money to, and

transact other business with the partnership, and, unless he is
also a general partner, receive on account of resulting claims
against the partnership, with general creditors, a prorata share
of the assets.
partnership
liabilities

If, at the time of receipt, the assets of the

are
to

not

sufficient

persons

not

to

claiming

discharge
as

partnership

general

or

limited

partners, no limited partner shall in respect to any such claim;
(a)

Receive

as

collateral

security

any

partnership property or,
(b)

Receive

from

a

general

partner

or

the

partnership any payment, conveyance, or release from liability.
(2)

Without

prior

written
3

full

disclosure

to

all

limited partners of the terms and the collateral involved in a
proposed loan by a limited partner, no limited partner shall make
a loan upon the security of the partnership property if, at the
time such loan is made, the assets of the partnership are not
sufficient to discharge partnership liabilities to persons not
claiming as general or limited partners.
(3)
collateral

The making of a secured loan, or the receiving of

security, or a payment, conveyance

or release in

violation of the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) is a fraud
on the creditors of the partnership.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The

Plaintiff-Respondent

has had

possession

of the

assets of the partnership since June 1, 1985, under the ruling of
the trial court at that time.

Pursuant to the ruling of the

trial court at that time and the later Decree of Dissolution and
Judgment, the Plaintiff-Respondent has been operating the Mobile
Home

Park

thereof
affairs.

and

pending

R.V. Park
a

final

and

keeping

"winding

up"

the
of

books
the

and

records

partnerships

There has yet to be the final Judgment of the trial

court relating to the accounting of the "winding up" of the
partnership affairs.

This final Judgment is required to fix the

reacquisition costs to the Defendant-Appellant should he attempt
to exercise his rights to reacquire the property under the terms
of the Partnership Agreement.
4

The Plaintiff-Respondent has always taken the position
that he was entitled to full ownership of the major asset of the
partnership, the Mobile Home Park and R.V. Park, under the terms
of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note which was executed on May
23, 1983. The trial court, however, set aside the Trust Deed and
Trust Deed Note and determined that the provisions of the Limited
Partnership Agreement should govern the relationship between the
general and limited partners and, after a series of hearings,
entered the final Decree of Dissolution and Judgment on May 20,
1987.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The Limited Partnership Agreement is not ambiguous

in making the distinction between initial capital contributions
and

additional

capital

contributions

to

be

made

by

the

Plaintiff-Respondent.
2.
permit

The trial court committed no error in refusing to

opinion

evidence

from

a certified

public

accountant.

There was no foundation to support the receipt of expert evidence
from the proferred witness.
3.

The

Defendant-Appellant

willfully

Partnership Agreement and the trial courtfs

breached

the

finding to that

effect is well founded within the record.
4.

The

trial

courtfs

determination

that

the

partnership should be dissolved was founded not only upon the
5

acquisition of more than 100% of the partnership assets by the
Plaintiff-Respondent, but was also founded upon the breach of the
Partnership Agreement by the Defendant-Appellant.
5.
determination

There was adequate support in the record for a
that

the

interest

rate

on

the

reacquisition

cost should be 1.5 percent over State Bank of Southern Utahfs
prime lending rate.
6.

The trial court could have enforced, and this court

should now enforce, the terms of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed
Note in order to eliminate all accounting and "wind up" problems
in this case.
7.

This appeal should be dismissed for the reason that

the Defendant-Appellant has failed to file a supersedeas bond.

ARGUMENT
I
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT IS NOT AMBIGUOUS IN
MAKING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INITIAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
ADDITIONAL
CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTIONS
TO
BE
MADE
BY
THE
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
A reading of the Limited Partnership Agreement easily
supports the finding of the trial court that the Agreement's
terms were unambiguous.

The pertinent paragraph 6 is quoted

hereafter:
6. CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LIMITED
PARTNER. The LIMITED PARTNER hereby agrees to
make initial capital contributions to the
PARTNERSHIP as follows:
A. To pay off a certain 2nd Trust
Deed presently of record against certain property
located at 966-988 West 400 North, Cedar City,
6

Iron County, Utah, said property being a six (6)
plex apartment building owned by the LIMITED
PARTNER, the 2nd Trust Deed evidences a debt of
approximately SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
$17,000.00 owed by the GENERAL PARTNER to the
Stratton Brothers Cattle Company as a result of
a previous law suit.
B. To use his best efforts to
substitute himself in place of the Country Aire
Estates, a California Limited Partnership, on a
1st Trust Deed Note between Country Aire Estates
and First Security Bank in Cedar City, Iron
County, Utah, which 1st Trust Deed Note covers
the real property described under paragraph 5
above.
'
C. To use his best reasonable efforts
to obtain a Letter of Credit or other bond or
security as required by Cedar City Corporation
to allow the development of the above-described
property as a planned unit development in
accordance with plans already preliminarily
approved by Cedar City Corporation and to pay
whatever expenses are attendent upon said bond,
Letter of Credit, or other security.
LIMITED PARTNER also agrees to contribute
additional cash or property as capital for the
use of the PARTNERSHIP for the following purposes, should the GENERAL PARTNER request said
contribution:
A. Payment of the amount due on an
unrecorded Real Estate Contract with a present
balance of approximately NINETY FIVE THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED ($95,500.00) which Contract covers
the sale of the real property described in
paragraph 5 hereof from Country Aire Estates, a
California Limited Partnership, to MURLAN D.
CARTER, the GENERAL PARTNER herein, which contract bears payments of TWELVE HUNDRED AND NINE
DOLLARS AND THIRTY EIGHT CENTS ($1,209.38) per
month with the entire balance due in 1983. The
payment of this Contract obligation will discharge any purchase money obligation owing
against the property described in paragraph 5
hereinabove by paying off the unrecorded Real
Estate Contract and the 1st Trust Deed Note
described in paragraph 6 (B) above.
B. Approximately SEVEN THOUSAND
DOLXJAJIS ($7,000.00) back taxes due and payable
to the County of Iron, State of Utah.
C. Approximately FIFTEEN THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($15,000.00) claimed by Eckhoff, Watson,
and Preator, Engineers of Cedar City, Utah, for
7

work allegedly done on the above-described real
property and for which a Mechanicfs Lien has
been filed and a law suit is in progress to
foreclose the Lien and collect the amount due.
D. Approximately FIVE THOUSAND
($5,000.00) for the Cedar City Sewer Improvement
District for sewer work in relation to the
above-referenced property.
E. Such other and further expenses
as may arise during the development of the
project.
It is the intention of the GENERAL PARTNER
and the LIMITED PARTNER to this Agreement, that
in return for LIMITED PARTNER'S initial investment of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000.00)
and his attempts to substitute himself in place
of Country Aire Estates, a California Limited
Partnership, on a 1st Trust Deed Note with First
Security Bank, and his best effort to provide a
Letter of Credit or other bond or security to
finance the developments to the above-described
real property; the LIMITED PARTNER shall have
and hereby is given a twenty percent (20%)
ownership interest in the real property and
project described above. Further, in the event
that LIMITED PARTNER is required to contribute
any more cash to the development of the project,
LIMITED PARTNER shall receive one (1) additional
percentage point of ownership interest for each
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) of additional
cash which he contributes to the project. Fractions of ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR ($1,000.00) contributions will buy LIMITED PARTNER an equal
fraction of ownership.
It is further agreed between the parties
that GENERAL PARTNER can reduce or eliminate
LIMITED PARTNER'S ownership interest in the
above-described real estate and project by
paying to the LIMITED PARTNER, any time within
five (5) years of the particular contribution
by LIMITED PARTNER, all or part of the LIMITED
PARTNER'S total contribution, which interest
is to be calculated quarterly at one and onehalf percent (1 and 1/2%) above the prime
interest rate. In the event that GENERAL
PARTNER pays off the entire contribution plus
interest as calculated above, then LIMITED
PARTNER shall be eliminated from this project
and shall have no further claim upon the
project. In the event that GENERAL PARTNER
pays only a portion of LIMITED PARTNER'S
investment, then LIMITED PARTNER'S interest
8

shall be reduced one percent (1%) for every
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) of LIMITED
PARTNERfs contribution repaid over and above
LIMITED PARTNER'S initial contribution as set
forth hereinabove in paragraph 6. Repayment
of all or part of LIMITED PARTNER'S initial
contribution shall be made in the same fashion
as repayment of the LIMITED PARTNERfs additional
contributions, that is ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS
($1,000.00) plus interest repaid to LIMITED
PARTNER will reduce LIMITED PARTNERS ownership
interest by 1 percent (1%).
In the event that GENERAL PARTNER sells
any portion of the above-described real estate
in any fashion whatsoever within five' (5) years
after any contribution by the LIMITED PARTNER
as set forth hereinabove, and the GENERAL
PARTNER does not within ninety six (96) hours
after receiving the cash in hand apply those
entire profits from said sale to paying off
the LIMITED PARTNER'S investment herein, or
applies only a portion of said profits to paying
off the LIMITED PARTNER'S investment herein,
then the amount of profits not so applied or
any profits received after the five (5) year
period will be divided between GENERAL PARTNER
and LIMITED PARTNER in the same percentages as
the percentage of ownership in said project held
by GENERAL PARTNER and LIMITED PARTNER at a
time 48 hours after GENERAL PARTNER receives
said profits as cash in hand.
The GENERAL PARTNER shall not encumber
the property described in paragraph 5 hereinabove without the prior written consent of the
LIMITED PARTNER. The GENERAL PARTNER shall
notify the LIMITED PARTNER in writing five (5)
days before the sale of the property described
in paragraph 5 hereinabove of his intention to
sell the property. If the LIMITED PARTNER
disagrees with any term of the sale or with
the sale itself, he must within five (5) days
after receiving notice of the GENERAL PARTNER'S
intent to sell, file with the GENERAL PARTNER
his objection in writing to the sale. In the
event that the GENERAL PARTNER and the LIMITED
PARTNER cannot agree on the arrangements for
the sale of any portion of the real property
described in paragraph 5 hereinabove, both
parties hereby agree that the dispute shall
be submitted to J. Philip Eves, Attorney at
Law, 110 North Main Street, Suite H., Cedar
City, Utah 84720, to act as arbitrator, or
9

such other person as J. Philip Eves shall
appoint. In the event that J. Philip Eves
fails or refuses to act as arbitrator or to
appoint someone else to act in the capacity,
the PARTNERS shall select another person upon
whom they can both agree to act in that capacity. The decision of the arbitrator shall
be binding on both parties.
The above-quoted portion of the Limited Partnership
Agreement

is

clearly

delineated

contributions to the partnership.

into

two

categories

of

First there is the initial
i

capital contribution payment of approximately $17,000.00 on the
six plex apartment building, then to use his best efforts to
substitute himself in the place of Country Aire Estates on a
1st Trust Deed Note with First Security Bank, and finally to use
his best efforts to obtain a Letter of Credit or bond required by
Cedar City Corporation for development of the Mobile Home Park
property.

The

Limited

Partner

then would

obtain

additional

interest in the limited partnership by paying, in 1983, the
entire balance of the Trust Deed Note with First Security Bank,
plus back taxes, plus a $15,00.00 Mechanic's Lien, plus $5,000.00
to Cedar City Corporation

and other development

costs.

The

initial contributions entitled the Plaintiff-Respondent to twenty
percent (20%) of the partnership.

The additional contributions

gave the Plaintiff-Respondent one percent (1%) per $1,000.00 of
contribution

giving

the

Plaintiff-Respondent

more

than

one

hundred percent (100%) of the ownership of the agreement.

II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
10

IN REFUSING TO

PERMIT OPINION EVIDENCE FROM A CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT. THERE
WAS NO FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THE RECEIPT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE FROM
THE PROFERRED WITNESS.
While the Defendant-Appellant has failed to cite to the
recprd the proffered testimony, the Plaintiff-Respondent believes
that the proferred testimony of Mr. Claude Slack of Cedar City
(T. 144-147) is the area of concern.

The proferred testimony

was:
Mr. Burns: We intend to prove, your Honor,
that under the terms of the Limited Partnership
and general usage of that accounting, that it
would be wholly and totally unreasonable for
anyone to ever have 122 percent of the limited
partnership, but it would be most reasonable to
have 20 percent of a limited partnership given
the contributions of Mr. Crowther, under general
accounting principles.
The trial court found that the proferred testimony
would "be a conclusion that would be invading the province of the
trier of fact.11 (T. 146)

No further proffer exists within the

record establishing the expertise of the proposed witness other
than his receipt of a bachelorfs degree in accounting and the
fact that he was a certified public accountant.
There is insufficient proffer or other evidence within
the record to establish the expertise of the witness, his degree
of familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus
between

his

opinion

and

the

facts

adduced.

(Edwards

v.Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 [Utah 1979])
Even if the exclusion of this testimony by the trial
court was error, the interpretation of the contract towards which
the testimony was directed would make such error harmless.
11

Ill
THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
WILLFULLY
BREACHED
THE
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND THE TRIAL COURTfS FINDING TO THAT
EFFECT IS WELL FOUNDED WITHIN THE RECORD,
The trial court was well within its perogatives when it
determined that the Defendant-Appellant had willfully breached
the

Partnership Agreement.

The

Defendant-Appellant

had

used

partnership funds to put tires on a vehicle not owned by the
partnership

and used by the Defendant-Appellant

personal use.

The Defendant-Appellant had paid his wife a salary

from partnership
taking

for his own

funds, when he himself was prohibited

from

such a salary, and no notice was ever given to the

Plaintiff-Respondent of this process.

Defendant-Appellant had

paid for his own real estate license from partnership funds. The
Defendant-Appellant never deeded the partnership property to the
partnership but kept it in his own name.
A review of the entire record and the accounting of the
Defendant-Appellant

shows

that

he

did

not

comply

with

the

requirements of the Partnership Agreement.

IV
THE TRIAL COURTfS DETERMINATION THAT THE PARTNERSHIP
SHOULD BE DISSOLVED WAS FOUNDED NOT ONLY UPON THE ACQUISITION OF
MORE

THAN

100

PERCENT

OF

THE

PARTNERSHIP

ASSETS

BY

THE

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, BUT WAS ALSO FOUNDED UPON THE BREACH OF THE
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
12

The statement of the trial court at page 200 of the
trial transcript gives the Courtfs reasoning very clearly:
The significance of that is that if I find
that the partnership still exists, it is in a
sense no longer a partnership because the
plaintiff would own 125 percent of it. The
defendant, and this wouldn't necessarily
dissolve — well, it would dissolve the partnership, but there would be contractual rights
that would — residual rights in the nature
of rights to redeem, which the defendant
would still own, which would differ somewhat
from rights to redeem under the trust deed
foreclosure and there may be some other significant things that I haven't thought through.
The courtfs reasoning for this determination is by a
clear reading of the Partnership Agreement.

The dissolution of

the partnership is supported by the Plaintiff-Respondent1s total
ownership of the assets of the partnership and the actions of the
Defendant-Appellant as a predator upon those assets.

The total

ownership of the assets is dealt with in the reading of the
Partnership Agreement as set forth in Argument I above.

The

record well supports and the court reasonably found that the
Plaintiff-Respondent

was

entitled

to

20

percent

of

the

partnership assets upon his initial contributions, and upon the
discharge of the $95,000.00 1st Deed of Trust at First Security
Bank acquired over 100 percent of the partnership.

The court

construed the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed executed on May 23,
1983,

as

additional

security

for the

Partnership Agreement,

rather than a transaction superceding the Partnership Agreement.
At that point, the Limited Partner had the total ownership of the
partnership interest and certainly had the right to request that

the court order the partnership dissolved, which the court did.
(48-2-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended)
The court also was well founded in determining that the
General Partner had breached the Partnership Agreement by the
manner in which the General Partner dealt with the books and
records of the partnership and with partnership funds. The court
heard

testimony

and

saw

other

evidence

that

the

Defendant-Appellant had paid a managerial salary to his wife out
of partnership profits (T. 72), had purchased tires for a vehicle
when the partnership

did not own a vehicle

purchased his own real estate license
items have been accounted

(T. 69-70) , and

(T. 73) .

All of these

for in the general ledger of the

partnership which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit P-13.
these

grounds

the

court

was

well

supported

granting

On
the

Plaintiff-Respondent's request to dissolve the partnership.

V
THERE WAS ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR A
DETERMINATION THAT THE INTEREST RATE ON THE REACQUISITION COST
SHOULD BE 1.5 PERCENT OVER STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH'S PRIME
LENDING RATE.
The

court

adopted

the

proposed

Findings

of

Fact

submitted by the Plaintiff-Respondent as is indicated at page 278
of the record.

The Plaintiff-Respondent had submitted proposed

Findings that tied the interest rate for reacquisition costs to
the prime lending rate of State Bank of Southern Utah, a bank
located in Cedar City, the residence of both Plaintiff-Respondent
and

Defendant-Appellant.

The
14

proposed

language

of

the

Defendant-Appellant used "New York prime lending rate" which is
an indefinite and unusable standard.
11,

The minute entry of June

1985, (R. 206) fixes the interest at 1 and 1/2 percent

over prime rate.

This reflects the same language referred to in

paragraph 6 of the Partnership Agreement as quoted above in this
brief.

The undersigned recalls that at the time of the June 11,

1985, hearing, the Defendant-Appellant agreed to use State Bank
of Southern Utah as the institution upon which to base the prime
rate figure.

However, there is no transcript of that hearing in

the record so it must be presumed that the court's finding is
correct.

VI
THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE ENFORCED, AND THIS COURT
SHOULD NOW ENFORCE, THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED
NOTE IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE ALL ACCOUNTING AND "WIND UP" PROBLEMS
IN THIS CASE.
The

Complaint

in

this

case

originally

sought

the

foreclosure as a mortgage of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note
executed by the Defendant-Appellant

on May

23, 1983.

If a

Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure were granted by this Court,
the

Plaintiff-Respondent

would

assume

all

of

the

ownership

interests in the Mobile Home Park and R.V. Park as his sole
remedy.

There would be no issue of the "wind up" of partnership

affairs or any claim for accounting after May 23, 1983, in this
action.

This remedy is clearly contemplated by the legislature

in the statutory provision of 48-2-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

15

as

amended.

This

position

was

argued

to

the

trial

court. (T. 193)

VII
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR THE REASON THAT THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO FILE A SUPERSEDEAS BOND.
Rule 8 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
provides for a stay of the Judgment of a Distript Court only upon
a Motion to the District Court from which the appeal is taken.
No

such

Motion

appropriate

bond

has

been

been

made

filed

in

this

is

contemplated

as

case, nor
by

has
Rule

any
8.

Without a stay order and the filing of the bond, which would be
demanded by Plaint iff-Respondent, the property which is the sole
asset of the partnership, will be sold at a Sheriff's Sale on May
23, 1988. The likelihood of this appeal reaching a resolution by
that date is slight.

The Defendant-Appellant has taken no action

to forestall the Sheriff's Sale and such a sale would render all
issues in this appeal moot.
of

the

Because of this failure on the part

Defendant-Appellant,

his

appeal

should

be

dismissed

forthwith.

CONCLUSION

The

Plaintiff-Respondent

respectfully

Court to dismiss the appeal forthwith.

requests

this

Should the Court decline

such a dismissal, the Plaintiff-Respondent

requests that the

Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note be foreclosed as a Note and
16

Mortgage immediately.
requests

that

the

Alternately, the Plaintiff-Respondent
Decree

of

Dissolution

and

Judgment

be

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of December, 1987.

J^&tfS L. SHUMATE
ttorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
110 North Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-3772

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to G. Michael
Westfall, Gallian & Westfall, Dixie State Bank Building, One
South Main Street, P.O. Box 367, St. George, Utah 84770, this
12th day of December, 1987, first class postage prepaid.
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